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Abstract
Reports of quantitative experimental results often distinguish
between the statistical uncertainty and the systematic uncertainty that
characterize measurement outcomes. This paper discusses the practice
of estimating systematic uncertainty in High Energy Physics (HEP).
The estimation of systematic uncertainty in HEP should be understood
as a minimal form of quantitative robustness analysis. The secure
evidence framework is used to explain the epistemic significance of
robustness analysis. However, the empirical value of a measurement
result depends crucially not only on the resulting systematic uncertainty
estimate, but on the learning aims for which that result will be used.
Philosophically important conceptual and practical questions regarding
systematic uncertainty assessment call for further investigation.
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1 Introduction
The responsible reporting of measurement results requires the characterization of
the quality of the measurement as well as its outcome. But the quality of a
measurement is not one-dimensional. Standard practice in particle physics requires
that all reports of measurement or estimation results must include quantitative
estimates of both the statistical error or uncertainty and the systematic error or
uncertainty. (This terminological ambivalence between error and uncertainty is
addressed below. In the meantime, I will use ‘uncertainty’ to avoid awkwardness.)
Such assessments of uncertainty are essential for the usefulness of measurement, for
without them one cannot determine the consistency of two results from different
experiments, two different results from the same experiment, or a single
experimental result with a given theory (Beauchemin 2015). Although a common
practice of experimental particle physicists (and scientists in many other disciplines
as well), the reporting of estimates of systematic uncertainty has gone largely
unnoticed (or at least un-discussed) by philosophers of science, apart from a few
discussions noted in what follows.
Such neglect is unfortunate, for discussions of systematic uncertainty open a
remarkable window into experimental reasoning. Whereas statistical uncertainty is
simply reported, systematic uncertainty is also discussed. Even the most cursory
presentation will at least note the main sources of systematic uncertainty, while
more careful reports (such as the example discussed in the appendix) detail the
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ways in which systematic uncertainties arise as well as the methods by which they
are assessed. Such discussions require forthright consideration by experimenters of
the body of knowledge that they bring to bear on their investigation, the ways in
which that knowledge relates to the conclusions they present, and the limitations
on that knowledge. This process is epistemologically crucial to the establishment of
experimental knowledge.
Moreover, philosophical insight regarding the estimation of systematic
uncertainty would be highly valuable. Presently, there is no clear consensus across
scientific disciplines regarding the basis or meaning of the distinction between
statistical and systematic uncertainty, despite some concerted efforts discussed
below. Scientists likewise debate the proper statistical framework in which
systematic uncertainty should be evaluated, a debate with important philosophical
aspects.
It is the contention of this paper that some progress may come from regarding
the estimation of systematic uncertainty as an instance of robustness analysis
applied to a model of a single experiment or measurement. More precisely, the
determination of systematic uncertainty bounds on a measurement result consists
of a weakening of the conclusion of an argument under the guidance of a robustness
analysis of its premises within the bounds of what is epistemically possible.
Experimentalists thereby establish the sensitivity of the measurement result
that is a crucial factor in its empirical value, while also establishing the security of
the evidence supporting the measurement result, which is necessary for the cogency
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of the argument supporting the claim expressing the measurement result. However,
I will argue, these two achievements are in tension with one another: as one
weakens the conclusion to enhance the security of the evidence, one diminishes the
sensitivity of the measurement result itself. Just how much empirical value a
measurement result maintains, however, depends not only on the extent to which
the sensitivity of the measurement has been weakened by systematic uncertainty
bounds, but also on the use to which it will be put.
This account builds on two significant recent contributions to the
philosophical study of measurement and measurement quality: Eran Tal’s
model-based account of measurement, according to which the evaluation of
measurement accuracy is the outcome of a comparison amongst predictions drawn
from a model of the measurement process (Tal 2012, 2016) and Hugo Beauchemin’s
discussion of systematic uncertainty assessment as an essential component of
measurement needed to determine the sensitivity of measurement results in HEP
(Beauchemin 2015).
Section 2 discusses the concept of systematic uncertainty, surveying the ways
in which uncertainty has been distinguished from error, and systematic uncertainty
from statistical uncertainty. Section 3 uses an example of a typical HEP
measurement to illustrate the complexities and importance of systematic
uncertainty and to introduce some of the debates among particle physicists
regarding the appropriate statistical framework for the estimation of systematic
uncertainty. Section 4 outlines the secure evidence framework employed in the
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analaysis. I present my argument for viewing systematic uncertainty estimation as
a kind of robustness analysis aimed at establishing empirical value in section 5. A
brief summary appears in section 6.
As an appendix, I present a discussion of an illuminating example from recent
particle physics: the ATLAS collaboration’s measurement of the tt¯ production
cross section from single lepton decays. The case illustrates the proposed analysis
of systematic uncertainty assessment, highlights some subtleties in its application,
and exemplifies the pervasive character of modeling and simulation in systematic
uncertainty estimation.
2 Systematic uncertainty: the very idea
To facilitate better conceptual understanding, we can begin by clarifying our
terminology, with some help from discussions among metrologists. Above I referred
to both error and uncertainty as being distinguished into systematic and statistical
categories. The two terms have distinct histories of usage in science. The scientific
analysis of error dates to the seventeenth century, while “the concept of uncertainty
as a quantifiable attribute is relatively new in the history of measurement”
(Boumans & Hon 2014, 7).
In practice, particle physicists have not always been careful to distinguish
between error and uncertainty. Recent papers from the CMS and ATLAS
collaborations focus their discussions on uncertainty rather than error, although
usage in is not perfectly uniform in this regard.
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Metrologists, by contrast, have articulated systematic distinctions between
error and uncertainty, as befits the science whose concern is the very act of
measurement. Yet the usefulness and definition of these terms remain matters of
debate among metrologists, whose Joint Committee for Guides in Metrology
(JCGM) publishes the “Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement”
(GUM) (Joint Committee for Guides in Metrology Working Group I (JCGM-I)
2008) and the “International Vocabulary of Metrology” (VIM) (Joint Committee
for Guides in Metrology Working Group II (JCGM-II) 2012). Those debates have
turned significantly on the question of the definition of error as articulated in these
canonical texts, particularly insofar as that definition appeals to an unobservable,
even “metaphysical” concept of the “true value” of the measurand (JCGM-I 2008,
36).
Some metrologists have defended the importance of retaining a concept of
error defined in terms of a true value or “target value” (Mari & Giordani 2014;
Willink 2013; Rabinovich 2007, 95). It is not the purpose of this paper to debate
these issues. For the sake of clarity, I will adopt the terminology of Willink (2013)
and understand a measurement to be a process whereby one obtains a numerical
estimate x (the measurement result or measurement estimate) of the target value θ
of the measurand. This usage allows for the straightforward definition of
measurement error as the difference between the measurement result x and the
target value θ.
We may then regard statistical and systematic error as components of the
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overall measurement error, and turn our attention to how they are to be
distinguished.
Following the JCGM, we could define the former (also called random error)
as the difference between the measurement result x and “the mean that would
result from an infinite number of measurements of the same measurand carried out
under repeatability conditions” (JCGM-I 2008, 37). Note that if the measurement
procedure is itself biased, then the latter quantity, i.e., the quantity that would
emerge as the mean measurement result in the long-run limit, will not be equal to
the target value. It is this inequality that is to be labeled systematic error.
One may approach the concept of systematic error by imagining a
measurement process in which it is absent. For such a process, the “mean that
would result from an infinite number of measurements of the same measurand
carried out under repeatability conditions” simply would be the target value.
Systematic error, then, is a component of measurement error “that in replicate
measurements remains constant or varies in a predictable way” (JCGM-II 2012, 22;
see also Willink 2013) and therefore does not disappear in the long run.
Eran Tal, in proposing a model-based account of measurement, has noted an
important limitation of this conceptualization of measurement error, which is that
it obscures the central role played by the model of the measurement process. The
JCGM’s appeal to an infinite number of measurements carried out under
repeatability conditions relies implicitly on an unspecified standard as to what
constitutes a repetition of a given measurement of a measurand. A model of the
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measurement process not only supplies that standard, it serves to articulate the
quantity measured by a given process and thus helps to specify what kinds of
measurement outcomes constitute errors. To make these roles of the model explicit,
Tal proposes a “methodological” definition of systematic error as “a discrepancy
whose expected value is nonzero between the anticipated or standard value of a
quantity and an estimate of that value based on a model of a measurement
process” (Tal 2012, 57). The notion of a true value or a target value of the
measurand has been supplanted here by an “anticipated or standard value” that
must be ascertained through a calibration process, which in turn is understood as a
process of modeling the measuring system. Tal’s emphasis on the process by which
the error is estimated renders the concept a methodological one, but not yet a
purely epistemic concept, for which Tal reserves the term ‘uncertainty’ (ibid., 30).
For purposes of the quantitative treatment of uncertainty, the GUM offers the
following definition of it: “parameter, associated with the result of a measurement,
that characterizes the dispersion of the values that could reasonably be attributed
to the measurand” (ibid.). This definition clearly marks uncertainty as something
potentially quantifiable, but also as something epistemic, requiring consideration of
some kind of standard of reasonable attribution. What the GUM’s definition does
not do, however, is to provide guidance for interpreting this notion of reasonability.
Neither does it provide clear guidance in understanding how to characterize the
distinction between evaluations of statistical uncertainty and systematic
uncertainty.1
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3 Systematic uncertainty in HEP
To better appreciate the distinction between statistical and systematic uncertainty,
and to think more concretely about the epistemic work accomplished by the
evaluation of systematic uncertainty, let us consider the disciplinary practices for
dealing with systematic uncertainty as it arises in measurements in HEP. We begin
with an example.
3.1 Measuring a cross section
Measurements of cross sections are a standard part of the experimental program of
HEP research groups. The cross section σ quantifies the probability of an
interaction process yielding a certain outcome, such as the interaction of two
protons in an LHC collision event yielding a top quark – anti-top quark pair (the tt¯
production cross section). At its crudest level, such a measurement is simply a
matter of counting how many times N , in a given data set, a tt¯ pair was produced,
and then dividing N by the number L of collision events that occurred during data
collection (the latter number particle physicists call the luminosity). We might call
this the “fantasyland” approach to measuring the tt¯ production cross section:
σtt¯ =
N
L
.
Reality intervenes in several ways to drive the physicist out of fantasyland:
(1) tt¯ pairs are not directly observable in particle physics data, but must be
identified via the identification of their decay products. These products are also
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not directly observable but must be inferred from the satisfaction of data selection
criteria (“cuts”). Events that satisfy these criteria are candidates for being events
containing tt¯ pairs.
(2) tt¯ candidate events may not contain actual tt¯ pairs, i.e., they may not be
signal events. Other particle processes can produce data that are indistinguishable
from tt¯ decay events. These events are background. It is the nature of background
candidate events that they cannot, given the cuts in terms of which candidates are
defined, be distinguished from the signal candidate events that one is aiming to
capture; one can only estimate the number to be expected Nb and subtract it from
the total number of candidate events observed Nc.
(3) Just as some events that do not contain tt¯ pairs will get counted as
candidate events, some events that do contain tt¯ pairs will not get thus counted.
This problem has two facets.
(3a) The tt¯ production cross section as a theoretical quantity might be
thought of in terms of an idealized experiment in which every tt¯ pair created would
be subject to detection in an ideal detector with no gaps in its coverage. Since
actual detectors do not have the ability to detect every tt¯ event, this limitation of
the detector must be taken into account by estimating the acceptance A.
(3b) The production and decay of tt¯ pairs are stochastic processes and the
resulting decay products will exhibit a distribution of properties. The cuts that are
applied to reduce background events will have some probability of eliminating
signal events. The solution to this is to estimate the efficiency  of the cuts: the
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fraction of signal events that will be selected by the cuts.
(4) The physical properties of the elements in a collision event are not
perfectly recorded by the detector. Candidate events are defined in terms of
quantitative features of the physical processes of particle production and decay. For
example, top quarks decay nearly always to a W boson and a b quark. A tt¯ pair
will therefore result in two W bosons, each of which in turn can decay either into a
quark-antiquark pair or into lepton-neutrino pair. To identify tt¯ candidate events
via the decay mode in which one of the W bosons decays to a muon (µ) and a
muon neutrino (νµ), physicists might impose a cut that requires the event to
include a muon with a transverse momentum pµT of at least 10 GeV, in order to
discriminate against background processes that produce muons with smaller
transverse momenta. Whether a given event satisfies this criterion or not depends
on a measurement output of the relevant part of the detector, and this measuring
device has a finite resolution, meaning that an event that satisfies the requirement
pµT > 10 GeV might not in fact include a muon with such a large transverse
momentum. Conversely, an event might fail the pµT cut even though it does in fact
include a such a muon.
These detector resolution effects require physicists who wish to calculate the
tt¯ production cross section to base that calculation not simply on the number of
candidate events as determined from the comparison of detector outputs to data
selection criteria, but on the inferred physical characteristics of the events taking
into account detector resolution effects. This process, called unfolding, requires
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applying a transformation matrix (estimated by means of simulation) to the
detector outputs. As Beauchemin emphasizes, unfolding is not a matter of
correcting the data, but inferring from the detector outputs (via the transformation
matrix) the underlying distribution, to which the cuts are then applied
(Beauchemin 2015, 23).2
(5) Finally, the luminosity is also not a quantity that is susceptible to direct
determination, since distinct events might not get discriminated by the detector, a
single event might mistakenly get counted as two distinct events, and some events
might be missed altogether. The luminosity must therefore be estimated.
We have thus gone from the fantasyland calculation σtt¯ =
N
L
to the physicists’
calculation
σtt¯ =
Nc −Nb
AL
. (1)
This calculation is not merely more complex than the fantasyland calculation.
Every quantity involved in it is the outcome of an inference from a mixture of
theory, simulation, and data (from the current experiment or from other
experiments).3 Each has its own sources of uncertainty that the careful physicist is
obliged to take into account.
3.2 Methdological debates
But how ought one to take these uncertainties into account? HEP lacks a clear
consensus.
Discussions about the conceptualization of error and uncertainty, and about
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their classification into categories such as statistical and systematic, are
inseparably bound up with debates regarding the statistical framework in which
these quantities should be estimated and expressed. When discussion focuses on
statistical error alone, the applicability of a strictly frequentist conception of
probability stirs up no significant controversy. One can clearly incorporate into
one’s model of an experiment or measuring device a distribution function
representing the relative frequency with which the experiment or device would
indicate a range of output values (results) for a given value of the measurand. Such
a model, which will inevitably involve some idealization, can be warranted by a
chain of calibrations. Indeed, as argued by Tal (2012), the warranting of inferences
from measurement results in general requires such idealization. One can then
incorporate this distribution of measurement errors into one’s account of the
measurement’s impact on the uncertainty regarding the value of the measurand.
Systematic errors cannot be treated in this same straightforward manner.
Consider the paradigmatic example of systematic error: a biased measuring device.
Suppose that a badly-constructed ruler for measuring length systematically adds
0.5 cm whenever one measures a 10.0 cm length. Repeated measurements of a
given 10.0 cm standard length would produce results that cluster according to
some distribution around the expectation value 10.5 cm. The difference between
the 10.0 cm standard length and the expectation value of 10.5 cm just is the
systematic error on such measurements. If we know that this bias is present, we
can eliminate it by correction.
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The problem of the estimation of systematic uncertainty arises precisely when
one cannot apply the correction strategy because the magnitude of the error is
unknown. The investigator knows that a systematic error might be present, and
the problem is to give reasonable bounds on its possible magnitude. To this
problem the notion of a frequentist probability distribution no longer has an
obvious direct applicability; the error is either systematically present (and with
some particular, but unknown, magnitude), or it is not.4
As a consequence, investigators employing frequentist statistics to evaluate
statistical uncertainty must report systematic uncertainty separately, as particle
physicists typically do. The quantities denoted ‘statistical’ and ‘systematic’ in a
statement such as ‘σtt¯ = 187± 11(stat.)+18−17(syst.) pb’ are conceptually
heterogeneous. Combining them into a single quantity and calling it the “total
uncertainty” is problematic.
One response to this problem is to adopt the Bayesian conception of
probability as a measure of degree of belief. Such a shift from frequentist to
Bayesian probabilities is a natural concomitant of the shift from an Error Approach
to an Uncertainty Approach as discussed in the VIM, because the expectation
value of a Bayesian probability distribution is no longer understood as the mean in
the long-run limit, but the average of all possible measurement results weighted by
how strongly the investigator believes that a given result will obtain, when applied
to a given measurand. A putative advantage of this Bayesian approach is that it
allows for the straightforward synthesis of statistical and systematic uncertainties
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into a single quantity. Both Sinervo and the JCGM (JCGM-I 2008, 57) cite this as
a point in favor of a Bayesian understanding of the probabilities in a quantitative
treatment of systematic uncertainty.
Adopting a Bayesian approach comes with well-known difficulties, however,
also acknowledged by Sinervo (see also Barlow 2002). Investigators must provide a
prior distribution for each parameter that contributes to the systematic uncertainty
in a given measurement. Just what the constraints on such prior distributions
ought to be (aside from simple coherence) is very unclear.
A third approach to the problem employs a hybrid of Bayesian and
frequentist techniques. The Cousins–Highland method relies on a calculation that
takes a frequentist probability distribution (giving rise to the statistical error) and
“smears” it out by applying a Bayesian probability distribution to whatever
parameters that distribution might depend on that are sources of systematic
uncertainty (Cousins & Highland 1992).
The basic idea is this: suppose that one has a set of observations
xi, i = 1, . . . , n, distributed according to p(x|θ), and that the data {xi} are to be
used to make inferences about the parameter θ. Now, suppose that such inferences
require assumptions about the value of λ, an additional parameter, the value of
which is subject to some uncertainty. The hybrid method involves introducing a
prior distribution, pi(λ), to enable the calculation of a modified probability
distribution pCH(x|θ) =
∫
p(x|θ, λ)pi(λ)dλ, which then becomes the basis for
statistical inferences (Sinervo 2003, 128).
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The Cousins-Highland hybrid approach yields, as critics have noted (Cranmer
2003; Sinervo 2003), neither a coherent Bayesian nor a coherent frequentist
conception. The statistical distribution p(x|θ) is intended to be frequentist, but the
prior distribution on λ has no truly frequentist significance, leaving the modified
distribution pCH(x|θ) without any coherent probability interpretation. Cousins and
Highland defend the approach on the grounds that it adheres as closely as possible
to a frequentist approach while avoiding “physically unacceptable” consequences of
a “consistently classical” approach, viz., that when deriving an upper limit on a
quantity from two otherwise identical experiments, the stricter limit will be
derivable from the one that has a larger systematic uncertainty (Cousins &
Highland 1992; Cousins 1995).
The discussion thus far serves to illustrate some of the ways in which the
conceptual underpinnings of systematic uncertainty estimation remain unsettled.
The conceptual disorder not only poses an intellectual problem, but contributes to
ongoing confusion and controversy over the appropriate methodology for
estimating uncertainty. Moreover, the problems spill over into the use of
uncertainty bounds when determining the compatibility of one measurement result
with another, or with a theoretical prediction. The problem then arises as to how
statistical and systematic uncertainties will be combined. It is common to add
them in quadrature, for example when using a χ2 fit test, but doing so introduces
distributional assumptions that may be unwarranted, and that may not reflect the
manner in which the systematic uncertainty was in fact determined in the first
16
place. One could simply add the two uncertainty components in a linear manner,
but this would in many cases significantly and unnecessarily reduce the sensitivity
of the measurement results (an issue that will be explored further below). HEP
currently lacks a satisfactory methodology for treating systematic uncertainty.
Without attempting to resolve such thorny methodological disputes at once,
we can progress towards a more satisfactory treatment of uncertainty estimation by
first grasping more clearly the epistemic work such estimates seek to accomplish.
I will argue that by working within the secure evidence framework, we can at
least partially assimilate the epistemic work accomplished by systematic
uncertainty estimation to that accomplished by robustness analysis. That
systematic uncertainty estimation provides a means for investigating the robustness
of a measurement result has already been argued in an illuminating essay by
Beauchemin (Beauchemin 2015). By quantifying both the uncertainty of a
measurement result and its sensitivity to the phenomena under investigation, he
argues, scientists can quantify the scientific value of a measurement result and
provide criteria for minimizing the circularity that arises from the theory-laden
aspect of measurement.
Here I aim to build upon the insights of Beauchemin by providing a broader
epistemological framework for understanding what is achieved through robustness
analysis in the context of estimating systematic uncertainty. The secure evidence
framework I invoke involves no explicit commitment to either frequentist or
Bayesian statistical frameworks. The relevant modality in the framework is
17
possibility, which I take to be conceptually prior to probability, insofar as no
probability function can be specified without specifying a space of objects (whether
events, propositions, or sentences) over which the function is to be defined.
4 The secure evidence framework
Here I explain the secure evidence framework that will be used to analyze these
issues (Staley 2004; Staley & Cobb 2011; Staley 2012, 2014). On the one hand, we
might wish to think of the evidence or support for a hypothesis provided by the
outcome of a test of that hypothesis in objective terms, such that facts about the
epistemic situation of the investigator are irrelevant. On the other hand, it seems
quite plausible that evaluating the claims that an investigator makes about such
evidential relations may require determining what kinds of errors investigators are
in a position to justifiably regard as having been eliminated, which does depend on
their epistemic situation. The secure evidence framework provides a set of concepts
for understanding the relationship between the situation of an epistemic agent
(either individual or corporate) and the objective evidential relationships that
obtain between the outcomes of tests and the hypotheses that are tested. This
account relies centrally on a concern with possible errors, and explicitly
understands the relevant modality for possible errors to be epistemic.
An epistemic agent who evaluates the evidential bearing of some body of data
x0 with regard to a hypothesis H must also consider the possibilities for error in
the evaluation thus generated. This is the “critical mode” of evidential evaluation.
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Evidential judgments rely on premises, and errors in the premises of such a
judgment may result in errors in the conclusion. A responsible evaluation of
evidence therefore requires consideration of the ways the world might be, such that
a putative evidential judgment would be incorrect. The evaluator must reflect on
what, among the propositions relevant to the judgment in question, may safely be
regarded as known, and what propositions must be regarded as assumed, but
possibly incorrect.
Such possibilities of error are here regarded as epistemic possibilities. Often,
when one makes a statement in the indicative that something might be the case,
one is expressing an epistemic possibility, with what must be the case functioning
as its dual expressing epistemic necessity (Kratzer 1977). An expression roughly
picking out the same modality (at least for the singular first-person case) is ‘for all
I know’, as in ‘for all I know there is still some ice cream in the freezer’. Theorists
have offered a range of views regarding the semantics of epistemic modality (see
Egan & Weatherson 2011), with various versions of contextualism and relativism
among the contending positions. For our purposes we need only note that what is
epistemically possible for an epistemic agent does depend on that agent’s
knowledge state and that when an agent acquires new knowledge it always follows
that some state of affairs that was previously epistemically possible for that agent
ceases to be so.
The epistemic possibilities that are relevant to the critical mode of evidential
judgment are error scenarios, which are to be understood as follows: Suppose that
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P is some proposition, S is an epistemic agent considering the assertion of P ,
whose epistemic situation (her situation regarding what she knows, is able to infer
from what she knows, and her access to information) is K. Then, a way the world
(or some relevant part of the world) might be, relative to K, such that P is false,
we will call an error scenario for P relative to K.
Of special importance for this discussion are error scenarios for evidence
claims, where EC is an evidence claim if it is a statement expressing a proposition
of the form ‘data x from test T are evidence for hypothesis H’ (such hypotheses
may include statements about the value of some measurand in a measurement
process, and it is here assumed that measurement procedures and hypothesis
testing are epistemologically susceptible to the same analysis).
Suppose that, relative to a certain epistemic situation K, there is a set of
scenarios that are epistemically possible, and call that set Ω0. If proposition P is
true in every scenario in the range Ω0, then P is fully secure relative to K. If P is
true across some more limited portion Ω1 of Ω0 (Ω1 ⊆ Ω0), then P is secure
throughout Ω1.
To put this notion more intuitively, then, a proposition is secure for an
epistemic agent just insofar as that proposition remains true, whatever might be
the case for that agent. Thus defined, security is applicable to any proposition, but
the application of interest here is to evidence claims.
Note that inquirers might never be called upon to quantify the degree of
security of any of their inferences. The methodologically significant concept is not
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security per se, but the securing of evidence, i.e., the pursuit of strategies that
increase or assess the relative security of an evidence claim.
Two strategies for making inferences more secure are the weakening of
evidential conclusions to render them immune to otherwise threatening error
scenarios and the strengthening of premises, in which additional information is
gathered that rules out previously threatening error scenarios. Robustness analysis
constitutes a strategy for assessing the security of an evidence claim by
investigating classes of potential error scenarios to determine which scenarios are
and which are not compatible with a given evidential conclusion (Staley 2014).
The present analysis aims to show how the consideration and evaluation of
systematic uncertainty constitutes an application of the weakening strategy under
the guidance of robustness analysis.
5 Systematic uncertainty assessment as robustness analysis
To see how the evaluation of systematic uncertainty can be viewed as a variety of
robustness analysis, consider again the example of measuring the tt¯ production
cross section in proton-proton collisions. Recall how equation 1 relates that
quantity to other empirically accessible quantities:
σtt¯ =
Nc −Nb
AL
.
This equation is a premise of an argument for a conclusion about the value of σtt¯,
as are statements attributing values to each of the variables in the equation.
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If we take the conclusion of such an argument to be the attribution of some
definite value σtt¯ = σtt¯0, then (because the data are finite) the premises would fail
to provide cogent support for the conclusion. Were we to repeat the exact same
experiment, it is very probable that a different value assignment would result. It is
not clear that such a statement should be considered an experimental conclusion at
all. It appears to be a statement about the value of the quantity σtt¯, but its
usefulness for empirical inquiry is severely limited by the fact that the comparison
of any two such point-value determinations is effectively certain to yield the result
that they disagree. To restore cogency and empirical value, it is necessary to
replace the conclusion σtt¯ = σtt¯0 with one stating σtt¯ = σtt¯0 ± δ. Call this the
unmodulated conclusion. The addendum ‘±δ’ expresses the statistical uncertainty
that is a function of the number of candidate events, Nc. But it will also be
necessary to report the systematic uncertainty resulting from imperfect knowledge
of the acceptance, efficiency, background, and luminosity, as well as the unfolding
matrix used to determine the number of candidate events. That conclusion, which
includes a statement of statistical uncertainty, but adds the results of an
assessment of systematic uncertainty, we can call the modulated conclusion.
Importantly, lack of knowledge enters into statistical and systematic
uncertainties in quite different ways. In the case of statistical uncertainty, the
relevant lack of knowledge concerns the exact value of the quantity σtt¯, the
measured value of which is reported in the conclusion. The aim of the inquiry is to
reduce this uncertainty, and knowledge of the quantities on the right hand side of
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equation 1 is a means toward the achievement of this aim. The statistical
uncertainty that remains once those means have been deployed is a consequence of
the fact that any finite number of observations yields only partial information
about the value of σtt¯. For the purposes of assessing statistical uncertainty,
however, the premises in the argument for this conclusion are assumed to be
determinately and completely known. We take ourselves to know how many
candidate events were counted, for example, and as long as that number is finite,
there will be some corresponding statistical uncertainty on the estimate of σtt¯.
In other words, for the purposes of assessing statistical uncertainty, we
concern ourselves only with the possibility of errors in the conclusion of the
argument, errors that take the form of assigning incorrect values to the measurand.
For this purpose, the model of the measuring process is taken to be adequate and
the premises of the argument are assumed to be free of error.
Systematic uncertainty may then be regarded as arising from the
consideration that in fact the premises are not determinately and completely
known. Physicists are not in a position to know that a premise attributing a
definite value to, say,  is true. To derive an estimate of σtt¯, some value must be
assigned, but, having made such an assignment, investigators must confront the
fact that other value assignments are compatible with what they know about the
detector and the physical processes involved in the experiment.
The assessment of systematic uncertainty tackles this problem of incomplete
knowledge by, in some way, exploring the extent to which varying the assumed
23
values asserted in the premises, within the bounds of what is possible given the
investigators’ knowledge, makes a difference to the conclusion drawn regarding the
value of the measured quantity. This effectively generates an ensemble of
arguments corresponding to the considered range of possible value-assignment
premises. By considering such a range of arguments with possibly correct premises,
the investigators can then report a weakened conclusion such as
σtt¯ = 187± 11(stat.)+18−17(syst.)pb,
the correctness of which would be supported by the soundness of any one of the
arguments in the ensemble.
From the perspective of the secure evidence framework, such assessments can
be regarded as a combination of robustness and weakening strategies. Investigators
begin with a set of data xi, i = 1, . . . , n reporting observations relevant to the
measurement of some quantity θ. This derivation depends on assigning values
λj = λj0, j = 1, . . . ,m to each of a set of m imperfectly known parameters
necessary for the derivation of an estimate θˆ0 (with a statistical uncertainty
depending on the value of n). This yields the unmodulated conclusion, which we
might also regard as the unsecured conclusion, in the sense that the strategies for
securing evidence claims mentioned previously have not yet been applied to it.
Consideration then turns to limitations on the investigators’ knowledge of the
initial set of model assumptions. Using the robustness analysis strategy, alternate
sets of assumptions that are compatible with the investigator’s epistemic state are
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considered, taking the form λj = λj0 + εj for each λj and for a range of values of εj,
depending on the extent to which existing knowledge constrains the possible values
of λj. This yields a range of derived estimates lying within an interval θˆ0
+δ1
−δ2 , which
then can provide the basis for a logically weakened conclusion incorporating both
statistical and systematic uncertainties. The convergence of estimates generated by
the ensemble provides the basis for the robustness of this modulated conclusion.
The account just given is misleading in one respect. The evaluation of
systematic uncertainty is typically not a matter of directly varying the input
quantities in equation 1. Instead, physicists look upstream, to the methods and
models employed in the determination of those input quantities, and introduce
variation there. (The appendix gives examples of how this is done.) In some cases,
this is a matter of varying the value of some parameter in a model, in other cases it
is a matter of swapping one model for another. What is at issue in such variation is
not so much the question of what might be the true value of the parameter or the
true model (notions that might be inapplicable in a given case) as which models or
parameter values within a model might be adequate for the purposes of the
inference that is being undertaken (W. S. Parker 2009; W. Parker 2012).
The secure evidence framework gives us a new perspective on what is
distinctive about the assessment of systematic uncertainty: it involves
consideration of what might be the case regarding parameters in the model of the
experiment to which values must be assigned in order to derive an estimate of the
measured quantity. Systematic uncertainty is thus concerned with possible errors
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and inadequacies in the premises of an argument from a model of measurement
processes. The determination of systematic uncertainty involves the determination
of reasonable bounds on the possibility of errors in those premises and inadequacies
in the model of the process. Such analysis rests on an ensemble of completed
models, each of which corresponds to a potential error scenario regarding claims
about the value of the measured quantity. Only through the consideration of the
outputs of such an ensemble can a systematic uncertainty be assessed, whereas
claims about statistical uncertainty require only a single completed model.
Such a perspective also helps us to understand why systematic uncertainty is
important in science and should be important in the philosophy of science. As
noted in the introduction and documented in the appendix, while statistical
uncertainties are simply reported, a good assessment of systematic uncertainties
involves careful consideration of the relevance of a wide range of factors that are
relevant to the conclusion being drawn from the data, as well as careful probing of
the limitations on the investigators’ prior knowledge of those factors. Whereas a
model of the experiment is used to arrive at an unmodulated conclusion, the
modulated conclusion depends on a stage of critical assessment of that model,
achieved through a process of robustness analysis.
The empirical value of a measurement result depends not only on its security,
however, but also on its sensitivity, as explained in a recent paper by Beauchemin
(Beauchemin 2015).
The sensitivity of a measurement result depends on the comparison of “(1)
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the difference in the values of a given observable when calculated with different
theoretical assumptions to be tested with the measurement; and (2) the
uncertainty on the measurement result” (ibid., 29). Only if the systematic
uncertainty is sufficiently small in comparison to the differences between different
theoretically calculated quantity values can the measurement result be used to
discriminate empirically between the competing theoretical assumptions.
Sensitivity considerations thus reveal the cost of applying the weakening
strategy to enhance the security of a measurement result: One can weaken the
conclusion of an argument for such a result by enlarging the systematic uncertainty
bounds applied to it, thus achieving a conclusion that is secure across a broader
range of epistemically possible scenarios. However, if the systematic uncertainties
thus reported exceed the differences between values of the measurand yielded by the
theoretical assumptions to be tested amongst, then the level of security achieved
renders the measurement result empirically worthless relative to that testing aim.
6 Conclusion
These considerations highlight some important remaining questions. The most
pressing concern the determination of relevant epistemic possibilities for purposes
of setting systematic uncertainty bounds. The determination of systematic
uncertainty involves the determination of reasonable bounds on the possibility of
errors in those premises and inadequacies in the model of the process. Which
possibilities deserve consideration? What criteria ought to be considered when
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determining standards of reasonableness on such bounds? The previously
mentioned debates over methodology can be thought of as debates over the best
way to approach such questions.
Given the scant attention that the evaluation of systematic uncertainty has
received in the philosophical literature, it is to be expected that conclusions drawn
at this stage of inquiry should be provisional and exploratory in nature. I have
proposed that, while many questions regarding the assessment of systematic
uncertainty remain unresolved, a good first step towards a philosophical
appreciation of this practice is to regard it as a kind of robustness analysis. The
secure evidence framework provides a context for understanding robustness
analysis in general that also supports this identification of systematic uncertainty
assessment as a kind of robustness analysis. That a coherence can thereby be
established between this view of systematic uncertainty assessment and Tal’s
model-based account of measurement is an additional virtue of the present account.
Further discussion is, of course, needed. Of particular importance is to
engage the philosophical aspects of the debate over statistical methodology in
systematic uncertainty estimation. Gaining clarity about the aims of systematic
uncertainty estimation is crucial for this purpose. I have argued here for the view
that the aim of this practice is to secure the evidence supporting the modulated
conclusions that are the result of the assessment of systematic uncertainty.
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7 Appendix: measuring the tt¯ production cross section
Because assessments of systematic uncertainty are considered essential to the
publication of any experimental result in particle physics, the choice of an example
to illustrate the practice is largely arbitrary. Here I present a recent example from
the ATLAS group at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN, which also
illustrates the pervasive character of modeling and simulation in the analysis of
experimental data in contemporary High Energy Physics (HEP).
The cross section for a given state quantifies the rate at which that state is
produced out of some particle process. Cross sections serve as crucial parameters in
the Standard Model, and, especially in the case of the top quark, provide
important constraints on the viability of numerous Beyond–Standard Model
theories as well. Both ATLAS and CMS, its neighbor at the LHC, have published a
number of measurements of the production cross section for both top–anti top (tt¯)
pairs (Aad et al. 2012; Aad, Abbott, Abdallah, Abdelalim, et al. 2012b, 2012a;
Khachatryan et al. 2011; Chatrchyan et al. 2013) and for single top quarks (Aad,
Abbott, Abdallah, Khalek, et al. 2012). The present discussion focuses on a
measurement of the top quark pair production cross section based on a search for
top quark decays indicated by a single high momentum lepton (electron or muon)
and jets produced by strong interaction processes characterized by Quantum
Chromodynamics (QCD).
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Let us begin with the result that ATLAS reports:5
σtt¯ = 187± 11(stat.)+18−17(syst.)pb (2)
We have already seen the essential logic of such a measurement: One seeks to
estimate the rate at which tt¯ pairs are produced from the number of tt¯ candidate
events in the data. Making that inference, however, demands estimates of the
quantities in equation 1, and the accurate estimation of those quantities demands
skill and expert judgment.
The complete estimate of uncertainty in this case draws on more
considerations than I can address in a brief discussion (see figure 1), but the
following should suffice to communicate the nature of the problem.
Consider first the estimation of signal acceptance and efficiency. Estimating
these quantities requires consideration of characteristics of the detector, drawing on
the engineering knowledge of the detector’s design and construction as well as
experimental knowledge of its performing characteristics. This background
knowledge forms the basis for a computer simulation of the detector itself.
Estimating signal acceptance also involves the knowledge of the characteristics of
the signal itself: how are tt¯ pairs produced in the proton-proton collisions generated
at the LHC, and how do they behave once they have been produced? To model the
tt¯ signal, ATLAS uses a variety of simulation models and a variety of parameter
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the different channels were combined in the likelihood fit by mul-
tiplying the individual likelihood functions.
The normalisation of the tt¯ signal templates is the parame-
ter of interest in the fit and was allowed to vary freely in both
analyses. The tt¯ cross-section was assumed to be common to all
channels and the number of tt¯ events in each subsample returned
by the fit was related to the tt¯ cross-section by the expression
σtt¯ = Nsig/(
∫ Ldt × ϵsig), where Nsig is the number of tt¯ events,∫ Ldt is the integrated luminosity and ϵsig is the product of the
signal acceptance, selection efficiency and branching ratio, ob-
tained from tt¯ simulation. The normalisation of the backgrounds
was treated differently in the two analyses. In the untagged anal-
ysis the multijet and small backgrounds (single-top, diboson and
Z + jets production) were fixed in the fit to their expected con-
tributions, whereas the W + jets background was allowed to vary
freely in each channel. In the tagged analysis all backgrounds were
allowed to vary within the uncertainties of their assumed cross-
sections, described in Sections 3 and 6. These uncertainties were
used as Gaussian constraints on the cross-section normalisation.
The robustness of this fitting approach was checked with ensem-
ble tests. The central value and uncertainties returned by the fit
were shown to be unbiased for a wide range of input cross-
sections.
8. Systematic uncertainties
The evaluation of the systematic uncertainties was performed
differently in the two analyses. The untagged analysis performed
pseudo-experiments (PEs) with simulated samples which included
the various sources of uncertainty. For example, for the JES un-
certainty, PEs were performed with jet energies scaled up and
down according to their uncertainties and the impact on the cross-
section was evaluated. The tagged analysis, on the other hand,
accounted for most of the changes in the normalisation and shape
of the templates due to systematic uncertainties by adding ‘nui-
sance’ terms to the fit [41]. Templates of the samples with one
standard deviation ’up’ and ’down’ variations of the systematic un-
certainty source under study were generated in addition to the
nominal templates. The fit interpolated between these templates
with a continuous parameter by means of a Gaussian constraint.
Before the fit, the constraint was such that the mean value was
zero and the width was one; a fitted width less than one means
that the data were able to constrain that particular source of un-
certainty. The effects due to the modelling of the W + jets and
multijet background shapes, initial and final state radiation, parton
density function of the tt¯ signal, NLO generator, hadronisation and
template statistics cannot be fully described by a simple linear pa-
rameter controlling the template interpolation. As a consequence,
they were not treated as nuisance terms but obtained by per-
forming PEs with modified simulated samples, as was done in the
untagged analysis.
The nuisance parameters of the systematic uncertainties were
all fitted together taking into account the correlations among them
in the minimisation process. As a consequence, the uncertainties
on the fitted quantities obtained from the fit include both the sta-
tistical and the total systematic components. Therefore, to obtain
an estimation of the individual contributions to the total uncer-
tainty in the tagged analysis, each individual systematic uncer-
tainty was obtained as the difference in quadrature between the
total uncertainty and the uncertainty obtained after having fixed
the corresponding nuisance parameter to its fitted value. The cen-
tral values of the nuisance parameters after the fit agreed with
their input values. The fit was cross-checked using PEs where
the starting value of the nuisance parameters was different than
the nominal value. The result was found to be unbiased. In addi-
Table 2
Statistical and systematic uncertainties on the measured tt¯ cross-section in the
untagged and tagged analyses. Multijet and small backgrounds normalisation un-
certainties are already included in the statistical uncertainty (a/i) in the tagged
analysis. W + jets heavy-flavour content and b-tagging calibration do not apply (n/a)
to the untagged analysis. The luminosity uncertainty is not included in the table.
Method Untagged Tagged
Statistical Error (%) +10.1 −10.1 +5.8 −5.7
Object selection (%)
JES and jet energy resolution +4.1 −5.4 +3.9 −2.9
Lepton reconstruction,
identification and trigger +1.7 −1.6 +2.1 −1.8
Background modelling (%)
Multijet shape +3.5 −3.5 +0.8 −0.8
Multijet normalisation +1.1 −1.2 a/i
Small backgrounds norm. +0.6 −0.6 a/i
W + jets shape +3.9 −3.9 +1.0 −1.0
W + jets heavy-flavour content n/a +2.7 −2.4
b-tagging calibration n/a +4.1 −3.8
tt¯ signal modelling (%)
ISR/FSR +6.3 −2.1 +5.2 −5.2
NLO generator +3.3 −3.3 +4.2 −4.2
Hadronisation +2.1 −2.1 +0.4 −0.4
PDF +1.8 −1.8 +1.5 −1.5
Others (%)
Simulation of pile-up +1.2 −1.2 < 0.1
Template statistics +1.3 −1.3 +1.1 −1.1
Systematic Error (%) +10.5 −9.4 +9.7 −9.0
tion, large variations of the kinematic dependence of the nuisance
parameters (e.g. the JES as a function of the jet pT ) were con-
sidered and resulted in a negligible impact on the result of the
fit.
The systematic uncertainties on the cross-section for both
methods are summarised in Table 2. The dominant effects in the
untagged analysis were JES, multijet and W + jets backgrounds
shape and ISR/FSR. The latter was also important in the tagged
analysis, together with the uncertainty related to the signal MC
generator. In addition, this analysis was sensitive to effects related
to b-tagging, specifically the determination of the heavy-flavour
content of the W + jets background and the calibration of the
b-tagging algorithm itself. The luminosity uncertainty was 3.4%
[42,43].
Several cross-checks of the cross-section measurements were
performed. These included the results of the likelihoods applied
to individual lepton channels and tt¯ cross-section measurements
done with simpler and complementary approaches, including cut-
and-count methods and fits to kinematic variables such as the
reconstructed top mass. These cross-checks gave consistent results
within the uncertainties.
9. Results and conclusions
The results of the likelihood fits applied to the data are shown
in Figs. 5 and 6, where the distributions of the discriminants in
data are overlaid on the fitted discriminant distributions of the sig-
nal and backgrounds. The final measured cross-section results are:
σtt¯ = 173±17(stat.)+18−16(syst.)±6(lumi.) pb= 173+25−24 pb in the un-
tagged analysis and σtt¯ = 187± 11(stat.)+18−17(syst.)± 6(lumi.) pb=
187+22−21 pb in the tagged analysis. The two measurements are in
agreement with each other. The latter has a better a priori sensi-
tivity and thus constitutes the main result of this Letter. It is the
most precise tt¯ cross-section measurement at the LHC published to
date and is in good agreement with the SM prediction calculated
at NLO plus next-to-leading-log order 165+11−16 pb [1–3].
Figure 1: Tabl of statistical and systematic uncertainties for two different analyses,
one requiring events to include a jet from a b-quark (“tagged”) and one without that
requirement (“untagged”). Note that everything below the first line (“statistical
error”) is a contribution to the systematic uncertainty. The total systematic uncer-
t i ty is calculated by adding the individual contributions in quadrature. From Aad
et al. 2012b, 250.
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values within those models. It is this variation of modeling assumptions and their
role in the production of systematic uncertainty estimates that I wish to emphasize.
To simulate the production of tt¯ pairs in the collider environment, numerous
complex stochastic QCD processes must be estimated, none of which can be
calculated exactly from theory. The underlying event is the interaction between
colliding high energy protons. Particles involved in the collisions and their
subsequent decay products also emit QCD radiation, which is relevant to the
calculation of the probability of various outcomes. Both the Initial State Radiation
(ISR, prior to the beam collision) and Final State Radiation (FSR, subsequent to
the collision) must be modeled as well. Finally, quarks and gluons that are
produced in these processes become hadrons (bound states of quarks with other
quarks), a process known as hadronization.
To estimate the rate at which tt¯ pairs produced in
√
s = 7 TeV proton-proton
collisions will qualify as candidate events, ATLAS must simulate these physical
processes using a collection of computer simulations that have been developed over
the years by physicists. The simulations are based on theoretical principles and
constrained by existing data from previous particle physics endeavors. They use
the Monte Carlo method of generating approximate solutions to equations that
cannot be solved analytically.
ATLAS relies primarily on the Herwig (Hadron Emission Reactions With
Interfering Gluons) event generator. To model the the further development of a
collision event, ATLAS used the event generator MC@NLO (for Monte Carlo at
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Next-to-Leading-Order). This is a simulation that calculates QCD processes at the
level of next-to-leading-order accuracy but also models the parton showers of QCD
radiation that result from proton-proton collisions.
To further complicate things, the outcome of a proton-proton collision
depends on the way in which the momentum of the proton is distributed among its
constituent partons, described probabilistically by the Parton Distribution
Function (PDF). So crucial is the judicious choice of PDF in the simulation of
particle processes at the LHC that a special LHC working group (PDF4LHC) has
devoted its efforts to the formulation of recommendations for the choice of PDF
sets for particular LHC analyses (Botje, Butterworth, Cooper-Sarkar, de Roeck, et
al. 2011).
To evaluate the systematic uncertainty in their acceptance estimate, ATLAS
has to consider the potential errors introduced by their reliance on particular
simulations and particular assumptions that must be stipulated to apply those
simulations. They state directly that “The use of simulated tt¯ samples to calculate
the signal acceptance gives rise to various sources of systematic uncertainty. These
arise from the choice of the event generator and PDF set, and from the modeling of
initial and final state radiation” (Aad, Abbott, Abdallah, Abdelalim, et al. 2012b,
245). Evaluation of these uncertainties involves the quantitative assessment of how
much difference variations in those assumptions make to the estimate they
generate.
In explanation of their approach to this task, ATLAS notes that to evaluate
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uncertainties due to the “choice of generator and parton shower model” they
compared the results they had obtained using MC@NLO with those obtained
using an alternate simulation called Powheg, using either Herwig or Pythia (an
alternate event generator) to model the hadronization process. Yet another
generator, called AcerMC, in combination with Pythia, is used to assess the
uncertainty introduced by ISR/FSR assumptions, “varying the parameters
controlling the ISR/FSR emission by a factor of two up and down” (ibid.). Finally,
to evaluate the “uncertainty in the PDF set used to generate tt¯ samples, ATLAS
employed “a range of current PDF sets” following the procedure recommended by
the PDF4LHC working group.
Figure 1 gives the results of these procedures, for two different analysis
procedures, one requiring events to include a jet from a b-quark (“tagged”) and one
without that requirement (“untagged”), under the heading “tt¯ signal modelling.”
That table also tabulates all other sources of systematic uncertainty, yielding totals
arrived at by adding the individual contributions in quadrature (i.e., total
systematic uncertainties are equal to the square root of the sums of the squares of
the individual contributions).
One of the categories of systematic uncertainty is “object selection,” under
which heading we find the entries “JES [Jet Energy Scale] and jet energy
resolution” and “Lepton reconstruction, identification and trigger.” The motivation
for these entries concerns the way in which candidate events are defined, which is in
terms of the identification of decay products with certain properties. For example,
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this paper focused on tt¯ decays with a single high-momentum lepton (electron or
muon) and jets from QCD processes. The implementation of this idea was based
on the idea that the measurements of energy deposits in the detector could be used
to identify a track as resulting from the passage of an electron (or muon), the
momentum (transverse to the beam) of which could then be measured, to
determine whether they satisfied the threshold requirement of pT > 20 GeV. Only
events including such a high-momentum lepton and at least three jets with pT > 25
GeV (and meeting further requirements) could be counted as candidate events.
The identification of an event as including a high-momentum lepton and
three high-momentum jets, however, has its own uncertainty, and this is what the
“object selection” uncertainty seeks to quantify. There is always some chance that
energy will be deposited in the various detector components in a way that will
“fool” the detector into thinking that a high-pT electron has passed when it has
not. The uncertainty that results from this possibility entails that the number of
candidate events itself is to some extent uncertain.
Nonetheless, on the present account, such uncertainty remains systematic in
character insofar as its estimation relies on the consideration of alternate values of
a parameter in a model of the experiment. To assess systematic uncertainty in the
untagged analysis, ATLAS reports that they
performed pseudo-experiments (PEs) with simulated samples which included
the various sources of uncertainty. For example, for the JES uncertainty, PEs
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were performed with jet energies scaled up and down according to their
uncertainties and the impact on the cross- section was evaluated. (Aad,
Abbott, Abdallah, Abdelalim, et al. 2012b, 250)
Although a different methodology was used in the tagged analysis, that
methodology likewise relied on variation of parameter values in a model of the
experiment.
It is precisely the strategy of varying the inputs to a model-based estimation
procedure within the bounds of what is possible, given the limitations on one’s
knowledge, that is indicative of a robustness analysis in this context.
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Notes
1In fact, the GUM eschews this distinction in favor of a purely operational-
ist distinction between Type A uncertainty and Type B uncertainty, based
on the method by which uncertainty is evaluated. An evaluation of un-
certainty “by the statistical analysis of series of observations” is Type A.
Any other means of evaluation is classified as Type B.
2In the example discussed by Beauchemin, the measurement aims, not
at the total cross section as here discussed, but at the differential cross
section with respect to transverse momentum of the leading jet, making
the application of unfolding to the measurement of that specific quantity
all the more important.
3This discussion affirms Wendy Parker’s recent argument that computer
simulations can be “embedded” in measurement practices (W. S. Parker
2015).
4See, however, Cranmer 2003 for a step towards a strictly frequentist ap-
proach. Willink (2013) also argues that a frequentist construal of system-
atic uncertainty bounds is applicable for the consumer, rather than the
producer, of measurement results, if one adopts an enlarged view of the
measurement process to include the “background steps” that introduce
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systematic errors, so that anyone measurement result can be regarded as
having been drawn from a population that includes a variety of different
background steps.
5The paper reports two cross section estimates using different techniques.
The second estimate (σtt¯ = 173± 17(stat.)+18−16(syst.) pb) does not employ
a technique for tagging jets containing b quarks. ATLAS reports the sys-
tematic uncertainty due to the estimate of luminosity separately, adding
another ±6 pb to the measurements from each method. Both results, AT-
LAS states, agree with one another and with QCD calculations, but the
method using b-tagging “has a better a priori sensitivity and constitutes
the main result of this Letter” (Aad, Abbott, Abdallah, Abdelalim, et al.
2012b, 244).
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